The Return of Weekly DTIC: Comparing The .280 British and .30 Light Rifle, 1950
The next few installments of my Light Rifle series of articles will cover in detail the development of the two calibers that shaped the NATO rifle trials until 1953: The .280 British and the .30 Light Rifle, the latter of which – spoiler alert – subsequently became the 7.62x51mm NATO in 1954. The subsequent rejection of the more intermediate .280 British as the standard NATO rifle cartridge caused considerable controversy in the UK, and many experts today believe that it was the superior choice for a standard round versus the much more conventional .30 Light Rifle. Advocates of the .280 British lament its rejection as being politically-driven, but – while there’s considerable truth to that notion – there is another side to the story. One critical document from this period is A Comparison Test of United Kingdom and United States Ammunition for Lightweight Weapons, from 1950.
The document illustrates the more advanced stage of development of the .30 Light Rifle cartridge (the program for which began in 1944) versus the .280 British (starting circa 1948), particularly in the accuracy results:
In accuracy tests conducted as part of the February – May 1950 evaluation of the two rounds, the .30 Light Rifle consistently grouped with nearly half the dispersion of the British .280 cartridge. Further, the .30 Light Rifle was also shown to be superior with regards to penetration and trajectory, with the .280 pulling ahead in API ignition and tracer and observation round consistency.
The poor showing of the British round would prove to seriously hamstring the push for its adoption. While many other factors were in play, it’s likely that one of the major factors in the US officials resistance to the .280 caliber round was its inferior performance in these and other tests. While today, we know their standards were unrealistically high for modern warfare, the rejection of the .280 was a little more complicated than simple “Not Invented Here” syndrome.
Nathaniel is a history enthusiast and firearms hobbyist whose primary interest lies in military small arms technological developments beginning with the smokeless powder era. He can be reached via email at nathaniel.f@staff.thefirearmblog.com.
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The problem with "universal" rounds is that they are both too heavy and have too much recoil to allow for large quantities to be carried by the individual soldiers and controllable automatic fire without bipod support, and are too weak to reliably penetrate barriers at longer ranges. These tests show that it had been well known 60 years ago. You will need 2 rounds to fill the individual roles of personal small arm/light machinegun and designated marksman rifle/squad served machine-gun. The shortcut the US could have taken in the early 1950s would have been to keep the .30-06 in service (and push for more powerful loads, similar to current commercial ones), and introduce a full auto rifle shooting an SCHV cartridge to replace the M1 Carbine and many M1 rifles. But it would have been the same: 2 complementary rounds. There is no way around it.
If Saive's original "small" FAL chambered in 8x33 had been adopted late in WW II or soon after the War ended, a modernized version of it would very likely STILL be the main battle rifle of the western allies. No M-14, no M-16, no 7.62x51, no .223.